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A THROWBACK TO LESS ENLIGHTENED PRACTICES:  
J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. v. NICASTRO 
ZACH VOSSELER† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, 
Inc., a case arising from an Iowa corporation’s publication of an article 
about Al Polizzi, an individual living in Coral Gables, Florida.1  The 
article—which referred to Polizzi as “one of the ringleaders of a  
national gang of murderous, blackmailing prostitute-pandering crimi-
nals”—was printed in Look magazine and circulated throughout Florida.2  
Affronted by the article, Polizzi demanded the publisher retract it.3  
When the publisher refused, Polizzi filed a libel suit in the state court 
in his home county.4  The Court reversed the lower courts’ grant of a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,5 but more  
importantly, it “express[ed] no opinion” as to whether the publisher 
 
† Executive Editor, Volume 161, University of Pennsylvania Law Review.  J.D. Candidate, 
2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Miami School of Law,  
attended, 2010–11; B.S., 2007, The Pennsylvania State University.  I am beyond grateful 
to Tobias Wolff for his advice and feedback throughout this writing process; to Michele 
DeStefano for her guidance in the early stages of this Note and for inspiring my inter-
est in Civil Procedure; and, finally, to Angelica Boutwell, without whom I would most 
certainly not be where I am today. 
1 Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 667 (1953) (Black, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 667-68. 
5 Id. at 665 (majority opinion). 
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was “doing business” in Florida within the meaning of the require-
ments established eight years prior in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.6 
Justice Black strongly opposed the Court’s holding.  He was in-
censed that the Court had bypassed the “doing business” question in 
making its narrow determination.7  The personal jurisdiction land-
scape had changed greatly since International Shoe,8 and Justice Black 
was concerned that the Court would revert to old practice, as it had 
“refused to be bound by old rigid concepts about ‘doing business’” 
until it decided this case.9  As he wrote: “Whether cases are to be tried 
in one locality or another is now to be tested by basic principles of 
fairness, unless, as seems possible, this case represents a throwback to 
what I consider less enlightened practices.”10 
While the rationale of International Shoe and its progeny were, as 
Justice Burton rightly predicted in his Polizzi opinion, neither “aban-
doned” nor “impaired”11 after the decision, the personal jurisdiction 
doctrine may today be facing a variant of Justice Black’s fears. 
After two decades of dormancy, the sleeping giant of personal jur-
isdiction has finally awakened with the Supreme Court’s opinion in J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.12  However, as in its two most recent 
personal jurisdiction opinions, the Court was less than univocal.13  This 
Note attempts to understand the reasoning behind J. McIntyre; to de-
termine the status of the second prong of the Court’s (in)famous two-
part test for personal jurisdiction;14 to analyze J. McIntyre’s effect on 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the immediate future; and,  
 
6 Id. at 666 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
7 Id. at 669 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
8 See Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1998) (observing that International Shoe represented a “paradigm shift” in  
the Court’s jurisprudence). 
9 Polizzi, 345 U.S. at 669-70 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
10 Id. at 670. 
11 Id. at 672 (Burton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
12 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
13 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion), was decided 
in a 4-4-1 ruling, and in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) 
(plurality opinion), the minimum contacts issue (which arguably also caused the split 
in J. McIntyre) was decided in a 4-4-3 ruling ( Justices White and Blackmun joined both 
Justice Brennan’s and Justice Stevens’s concurrences). 
14 A defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with . . . [the forum State] 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  The Court’s ever-
changing opinion of what constitutes fairness and reasonableness, as well as how 
much weight should be afforded those considerations (if any at all), provided the 
impetus for this Note. 
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ultimately, to question whether J. McIntyre, too, represents a “throw-
back to . . . less enlightened practices.”15 
I.  THE DOCTRINE:  A THEMATIC REVIEW  
IN REASONABLE TERMS 
Following International Shoe’s firm proclamation that “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice” were a dominant feature of 
personal jurisdiction analysis,16 the Supreme Court decided several 
important cases that advanced this fairness standard.17  In McGee v. 
International Life Insurance Co.,18 the “high-water mark of personal ju-
risdiction,”19 the Court extended the doctrine under “evolving stand-
ards of due process”20 when it held that the defendant, a Texas 
insurance company, was amenable to jurisdiction in California.21   
Justice Black explained that McGee’s holding fit within a “clearly dis-
cernible” trend “toward expanding the permissible scope of state juris-
diction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.”22  This 
trend was in large part driven by the “increasing nationalization of 
commerce” and “modern transportation and communication [that] . . . 
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a 
State where he engages in economic activity.”23  When the insurance 
 
15 Polizzi, 345 U.S. at 670 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
16 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463). 
17 Scholars have thoroughly examined the fifteen or so major cases that make up 
the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  See generally Patrick J. Borch-
ers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:  From Pennoyer to Burnham 
and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990); Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due 
Process:  Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 
8-28 (2006); William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
599 (1993).  In a departure from the typical recitation of the history of the doctrine, 
however, this Note analyzes why the decision to exercise or deny jurisdiction in each 
case was the fair and reasonable decision, given that jurisdiction has been defined as a 
power to create or affect legal interests based on a “relationship to [a] state . . . such as 
to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24(1) (1971).  While power and sufficient contacts are important 
elements of personal jurisdiction analysis, reasonableness has always been paramount.  
See, e.g., id. cmt. b (“One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction. . . . [A] state 
does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it.”  
(emphasis added)). 
18 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).  
19 Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State 
Courts:  Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 489 (1984). 
20 See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978) (explaining the  
holding in McGee). 
21 See McGee, 355 U.S. at 224. 
22 Id. at 222. 
23 Id. at 223. 
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company actively sought to reinsure the plaintiff, and mailed a con-
tract to the plaintiff’s home in California, it should reasonably have 
expected to be sued in California on a cause of action arising from that 
contract.24  Justice Black’s invocation of the expanding scope of state 
jurisdiction signaled an expansion in the Court’s view of the circum-
stances under which the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable. 
In the years following McGee, the Court continued to push back on 
the notion of territorial sovereignty that the minimum contacts test 
seemed to champion, in favor of a more reasonable and equitable  
approach.  In Kulko v. Superior Court of California25—a child custody  
dispute filed by a California plaintiff-mother against a New York  
defendant-father—the Court stated that, like any standard requiring a 
determination of reasonableness, “the ‘minimum contacts’ test of  
International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application.” 26  In-
stead, the test requires a case-specific weighing of facts.27  Justice Mar-
shall, writing for the majority, held that “the circumstances in this case 
clearly render[ed] ‘unreasonable’ California’s assertion of personal 
jurisdiction”28 and supported that conclusion by “appeal[ing] to com-
muni-tarian values—objective, public concerns for fairness and rea-
sonableness.”29  In Kulko, the Court began to question the notion of 
territorial sovereignty implicit in the minimum contacts test,  
advocating a more reasonable and equitable approach and invoking 
what the Court termed “basic considerations of fairness.”30  According 
to Justice Marshall, these fairness considerations pointed “decisively in 
favor of [New York] as the proper forum for adjudication of this case, 
 
24 Id. 
25  436 U.S. 84 (1990).  In Kulko, two New York domiciliaries married in California 
during a three-day stopover while the husband was en route to military duty overseas.  
Mrs. Kulko returned to New York, and she was joined by Mr. Kulko at the conclusion of 
his tour of duty, whereupon they had two children.  The couple separated in 1972, and 
Mrs. Kulko moved to California.  Later, Mr. Kulko sent their daughter (at her request) 
to live with her mother.  Two years later, their son went to join his mother in California 
without Mr. Kulko’s consent.  Mrs. Kulko then brought an action in California against 
her ex-husband seeking, inter alia, full custody of her children.  Mr. Kulko made a spe-
cial appearance, claiming he lacked minimum contacts with California to warrant its 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over him.  Id. at 86-88.   
26 Id. at 92. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 96.  Justice Marshall specifically refuted the plaintiff’s reference to McGee, 
writing that the defendant’s activities “cannot fairly be analogized to an insurer’s  
sending an insurance contract and premium notices into the State to an insured  
resdent of the State.”  Id. at 96. 
29 Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argument:  The Personal Jurisdiction Par-
adigm, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 855, 869 (1986).  
30 Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97. 
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whatever the merits of [the mother’s] underlying claim.”31  The  
defendant had merely acquiesced to his daughter’s desire to live in 
California with her mother, and this single act “surely” could not be 
considered “one that a reasonable parent would expect to result in the 
substantial financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child-
support suit in a forum 3,000 miles away.”32  The Court thus found no 
basis for the claim that the defendant could reasonably have anticipated 
being haled before a court in California.33 
Two years later, the Court took these nascent beginnings of a  
reasonableness test, and endeavored to provide more concrete guid-
ance for courts attempting to apply the “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice” in the future.34  In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, the Court refused to allow a state to exercise personal ju-
risdiction over a nonresident corporation when the only connection 
between the corporation and the forum was a single product sold in 
the corporation’s home state that proved defective in the forum 
state.35  Looking to reasonableness, the Court adumbrated several fac-
tors for courts to consider, including 
the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute . . . ; the plaintiffs 
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief . . . at least when that 
interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiffs power to choose the 
forum . . . ; the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the sever-
al States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
36
 
However, because the Court found that Oklahoma failed the min-




33 See id. at 97-98; see also Greenstein, supra note 29, at 870 (discussing the Court’s 
references to the “nationalization of commerce” and to “modern transportation and 
communication” from McGee in order to distinguish this family law dispute “from the 
kind of commercial activity in which the significance of state borders diminishes”). 
34 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
35 See 444 U.S. 286, 296-98 (1980) (explaining that the unilateral activity of a con-
sumer taking a company’s product into a distant forum is not sufficient to render the 
company subject to jurisdiction in that forum).  World-Wide Volkswagen was the first case 
to address the issue of corporations injecting into the “stream of commerce” products 
that subsequently injure consumers in the forum state—the plaintiff had purchased a 
car in New York from a New York corporation and unilaterally brought it to Oklahoma.  
See id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the novelty of the majority’s reason-
ing in finding that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction). 
36 Id. at 292 (majority opinion). 
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particular facts of the case.37  Had it done so, the Court most likely 
would have regarded the exercise of jurisdiction over a small upstate 
New York car dealership and its regional distributor in regard to an 
accident that occurred in Oklahoma as unreasonable. 
Though the Court discussed the relationship between these new 
“fair play and substantial justice” factors and minimum contacts in 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,38 the Court finally applied the factors in 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California when eight Justices 
agreed that California’s attempt to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation violated “fair play and substantial justice.”39  First, the 
burden on the defendant was tremendous given the distance between 
Japan and California and the differences in both language and legal 
systems.40  Second, although the underlying accident occurred in Cali-
fornia, the State had no real interest in the outcome of the ultimately 
litigated dispute:  whether a Japanese parts manufacturer had to in-
demnify a Taiwanese company.41  Finally, there was no need to  
consider the plaintiffs’ interest in the case, as the plaintiff in the orig-
inal accident (who was not a California resident) had settled and was 
no longer a party to the suit.42  With these factors in mind, the Court 





37 Justice Brennan did apply some of the standards to the facts of the case in his 
dissent.  See id. at 300-01, 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
38 417 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (holding that minimum contacts “may be considered 
in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction 
would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’” (quoting International Shoe, 
326 U.S. at 320)). 
39 See 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (plurality opinion).  By the time this case reached 
the Supreme Court, all that remained of the initial products liability action was a dis-
pute between a Taiwanese tire manufacturer (Cheng Shin) and a Japanese valve as-
sembly manufacturer (Asahi) against whom Cheng Shin had cross-claimed, seeking  
indemnification.  Asahi, who had shipped its valves to only Cheng Shin in Taiwan,  
moved to quash the summons, claiming that California did not have personal  
jurisdiction over it.  Id. at 105-08. 
40 See id. at 114 (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself 
in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness 
of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”)  
41 See id. (reasoning that with only foreign parties left in the suit, California’s inter-
est in the case was “considerably diminished”). 
42 See id. 
43 Id. at 116. 
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II.  THE CASE:  NEITHER FAIRLY PLAYED  
NOR SUBSTANTIALLY JUST 
Looking through the lens of reasonableness and fairness, we can 
now critique J. McIntyre in an effort to discern why six members of the 
Court decided to subsume the “fair play and substantial justice” prong 
of the personal jurisdiction test under the minimum contacts prong 
when the former had previously functioned as an independent44 and essen-
tial part of the analysis.45 
A. Background 
Robert Nicastro, an employee of Curcio Scrap Metal in Saddle 
Brook, New Jersey, was operating a recycling machine used to cut 
metal when his right hand was accidentally caught in the machine’s 
blades, severing four of his fingers.46  The machine, the McIntyre 
Model 640 Shear, was manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. 
(J. McIntyre or J. McIntyre Machinery), a company incorporated in 
the United Kingdom.47  The machine had been sold to Curcio Scrap 
Metal through J. McIntyre’s exclusive United States distributor,  
 
44 See Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process:  Personal Juris-
diction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 509-10 (1987) (asserting that 
the Court in Asahi did treat the minimum contacts and reasonableness “as distinct 
elements, with both necessary in order to support jurisdiction”). 
45 To be clear, this Note makes no claim either that the Court should absolutely 
have upheld personal jurisdiction purely on the basis of the fairness standard, or that 
fairness should take precedence over minimum contacts.  Instead, this Note acknowl-
edges that personal jurisdiction had developed into a two-prong standard and argues 
that it should have remained that way.  The Asahi Court felt it necessary to engage in a 
minimum contacts analysis even though eight members of the Court agreed that the 
result of the Court’s fairness analysis was sufficient to keep the case out of California.  
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (“An examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine 
whether a state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional.”).  The re-
verse should have been true in J. McIntyre—the fairness factors deserved at least some 
examination, but they were ignored.  Cf. Richard D. Freer, Robert Howell Hall Profes-
sor of Law, Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Justice Brennan’s Jurisdictional Jurisprudence:  Did 
He Really Have it His Way?, Speech at the South Carolina Law Review Symposium:  
Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century:  The Implications of McIntyre  
and Goodyear Dunlop Tires (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://video.sc.edu/law/ 
lawrev4brennan.mov, at 9:34 (stating that Justice Brennan’s opinion in Burger King 
“c[ame] very close to guaranteeing that fairness factors will always be on the table”). 
46 See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010) (provid-
ing information on the underlying facts of the case), rev’d, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
47 Id. 
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McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. (McIntyre America).48  Nicastro 
filed a products liability action against both J. McIntyre and McIntyre 
America, claiming that the Model 640 Shear “failed to contain ade-
quate warnings or instructions” and that it was lacking a safety guard 
that would have prevented the accident.49 
Before the accident, Robert Curcio, the owner of Curcio Scrap 
Metal, attended an Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries convention 
in Las Vegas.50  During the convention, he visited McIntyre America’s 
booth and was introduced to the Model 640 Shear.51  He purchased 
the machine from McIntyre America for $24,900 and it was shipped to 
Curcio from McIntyre America’s headquarters in Ohio.52  Although 
the check was payable to “McIntyre Machinery of America, Inc.,” the 
Model 640 Shear was affixed with a label stating J. McIntyre Machin-
ery’s name and United Kingdom address.53 
It was unclear which company was responsible for J. McIntyre 
products reaching American hands.  Although J. McIntyre and McIn-
tyre America were distinct corporate entities, McIntyre America “struc-
tured its advertising and sales efforts in accordance with J. McIntyre’s 
direction and guidance whenever possible.”54  Furthermore, J. McIn-
tyre may have retained ownership of the machines it sent to McIntyre 
America, evidenced by a letter from J. McIntyre’s president to McIn-
tyre America, which stated, “Please note that th[e] machines are our 
property until they have been paid for in full.”55  The president of J. 
McIntyre Machinery had attended the convention in Las Vegas, and 
other officials from J. McIntyre had attended conventions and similar 
events in Chicago, New Orleans, Orlando, San Diego, and San Fran-
cisco, among other cities.56  Despite the presence of J. McIntyre offi-
cials, however, McIntyre America fielded all requests for information 
about J. McIntyre’s products at these events.57   
The New Jersey trial court granted J. McIntyre’s motion to dismiss, 
stating that J. McIntyre had “no contacts” with the state.58  The Appellate 
 
48 Id. 









58 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  McIntyre America never participated 
in the lawsuit.  The company filed for bankruptcy in 2001.  Id. at 578 n.2. 
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Division reversed, holding that New Jersey’s exercise of personal juris-
diction “would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.”59  The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that decision, 
holding that a foreign manufacturer that places a product in the 
stream of commerce “through a distribution scheme that targets a na-
tional market, which includes New Jersey” should be subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in New Jersey.60  Subsequently, J. McIntyre appealed 
to the Supreme Court.61  The Court reversed the judgment of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in a 4-2-3 decision, holding that New Jersey 
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre.62 
B.  Justice Kennedy’s Plurality Opinion 
Patrick Borchers describes Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion as 
“quite possibly the most poorly reasoned and obtuse decision of the 
entire minimum contacts era.”63  Whether Professor Borchers is cor-
rect or not, J. McIntyre does represent a “throwback to . . . less enlight-
ened practices”64—a retreat to a Pennoyer v. Neff--esque65 jurisprudence 
of territorial sovereignty.  In J. McIntyre, Justice Kennedy purported to 
answer the “decades-old questions left open in Asahi”66—questions 
that had arisen only because none of the writing Justices in Asahi 
could command a majority, thereby leaving the stream-of-commerce 
theory broken and forcing the lower courts to pick up the pieces.67  How-
ever, his opinion appears to have abandoned considerations of reasona-
bleness, which is the core of post-Pennoyer personal jurisdiction theory. 
Attempting to do away with fairness and reasonableness considera-
tions, Justice Kennedy wrote, “Freeform notions of fundamental fair-
ness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment 
 
59 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct.  
App. Div. 2008). 
60 McIntyre America, 987 A.2d at 589. 
61 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (granting certiorari). 
62 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
63 Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the 
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1263 (2011).  Professor Borchers 
goes on to state that the plurality’s “saving grace, if one can call it that, is that it attract-
ed only four votes.”  Id. 
64 Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 670 (1953) (Black, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
65 95 U.S. 714 (1878), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
66 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785. 
67 See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 587-88 nn.10-12 (N.J. 
2010) (surveying the landscape of various courts’ responses to the Asahi opinions). 
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rendered in the absence of authority into law.”68  In the place of fair-
ness and reasonableness analysis, Justice Kennedy described the  
“general rule” of a sovereign’s exercise of jurisdiction over a defen- 
dant as requiring “some act by which the defendant ‘purposefully 
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’”69  Jus-
tice Kennedy added that “in some cases . . . the defendant 
might . . . fall within the State’s authority by reason of his attempt to ob-
struct its laws.”70  Applying this general rule, Justice Kennedy found that 
New Jersey should not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction over  
J. McIntyre Machinery.71  
Allan Ides portrays Justice Kennedy’s discussion of obstruction of 
the laws as a version of the Calder v. Jones72 effects test, in that it de-
scribes a condition sufficient for exercising jurisdiction when an out-
of-state defendant causes an obstruction of the law in the forum 
state.73  If Professor Ides is correct, Justice Kennedy’s opinion merely 
raises the question:  How is J. McIntyre Machinery not obstructing the 
laws of New Jersey, or of the United States as a whole, by sending 
products into its jurisdiction but evading its courts?74  Though this is 
not an intentional tort case, which the Court in Calder confronted 
when creating the effects test, the New Jersey Supreme Court believed 
that the “preeminent issue” in this case was whether it would “read the 
Due Process Clause in a way that renders a state powerless to provide 
relief to a resident who suffers injuries from a product that was sold 
and marketed by a manufacturer, through an independent distribu-
tor, knowing that the final destination might be a New Jersey consum-
er.”75  The New Jersey court also believed important policy considerations 
supported its exercise of jurisdiction, including the state’s compelling 
and “paramount interest in ensuring a forum for its injured citizens 
who have suffered catastrophic injuries due to allegedly defective 
 
68 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787. 
69 Id. at 2787 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
70 Id. at 2787  
71 Id. at 2791. 
72 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
73 Allan Ides, Foreword:  A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIn-
tyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 359 n.82 (2012). 
74 See Borchers, supra note 63, at 1265 (hypothesizing that even Ohio, the location 
of the U.S. distributor, would fail the plurality’s targeting test, because Ohio was “mere-
ly a way station for machines destined for other states,” which would result “in the bi-
zarre conclusion that a foreign distributor, intentionally exploiting the U.S. market (even 
on the plurality’s account), is nonetheless not amenable to jurisdiction in any state.”). 
75 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 590 (N.J. 2010). 
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products in the workplace.”76  The New Jersey court acknowledged 
that it would be “strange indeed” if a New Jersey manufacturer of a 
defective product—which would clearly be subject to the jurisdiction 
of New Jersey’s courts—could relocate its operation to a foreign coun-
try, sell its products through an exclusive independent distributor to 
New Jersey consumers, and by virtue of its relocation “suddenly be-
come beyond the reach of one of our injured citizens through this 
State’s legal system.”77  Although J. McIntyre was never based in New 
Jersey, this hypothetical exposes the Supreme Court’s strange logic 
and the unfairness of the plurality’s opinion. 
Later in his opinion, Justice Kennedy characterized Justice Bren-
nan’s Asahi concurrence—which allegedly “discarded the central con-
cept of sovereign authority”78 in order to “advocat[e] a rule based on 
general notions of fairness and foreseeability”—as being “inconsistent 
with the premises of lawful judicial power.”79  According to Justice 
Kennedy, this conclusion was supported by the fact that the Court in 
Burnham v. Superior Court of California “‘conducted no independent in-
quiry into the desirability or fairness’ of the rule that service of process 
within a State suffices to establish jurisdiction over an otherwise for-
eign defendant.”80  It should be noted, however, that five of the nine 
Justices in Burnham, including Justice Brennan, did discuss the fairness 
of the decision.  Justice Brennan stated that unlike the plurality, he 
“would undertake an ‘independent inquiry into the . . . fairness,’”81 and 
Justice Stevens stated that the “considerations of fairness identified by 
Justice Brennan” demonstrated that Burnham was “a very easy case.”82 
In J. McIntyre, Justice Kennedy sought to demonstrate the undesir-
ability of Justice Brennan’s stream-of-commerce theory by describing 
the hypothetical plight of a small-time Florida farmer.83  In this hypo-
thetical, the small-time farmer sells crops to a distributor who then 
sells those same crops to supermarkets across the country.84  “If fore-
seeability were the controlling criterion,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “the 
 
76 See id. at 590 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985)). 
77 Id. at 591. 
78 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
79 Id. at 2789. 
80 Id. (quoting Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (plurality opinion)). 
81 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis 
added) (quoting id. at 621 (plurality opinion)). 
82 Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
83 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion). 
84 Id. 
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farmer could be sued in Alaska or any number of other States’ courts 
without ever leaving town.”85 
In constructing this hypothetical, Justice Kennedy ignores the rea-
soning of World-Wide Volkswagen that if the risks of litigation in a par-
ticular state are too great, a corporation (or small-time farmer) can 
alleviate the risk of adverse litigation by severing ties with that forum.86  
If the farmer was worried about litigation in Alaska, and was aware that 
the distributor sent its crops to Alaska, he could stop doing business 
with the distributor or dictate to the distributor the states to which his 
products should be shipped.87  By basing jurisdiction on contacts 
alone,88 Justice Kennedy creates a line of reasoning that would seem to 
rule out not only Alaska, but also Georgia and Alabama as possible 
fora for plaintiffs seeking redress against the farmer.89  But if Justice 
Kennedy had simply based jurisdiction on the fairness analysis dis-
cussed in World-Wide Volkswagen and other cases—and made binding in 
Asahi—the Alaska court could reasonably reject jurisdiction as simply 
unfair.  The burden on a small-time Florida defendant litigating in 
Alaska would be immense and would be a substantial consideration 
 
85 Id. 
86 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (ex-
plaining how companies might deal with the likelihood of burdensome litigation  
under the “purposeful availment” test). 
87 See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations:  Two Profiles for Specific Jurisdic-
tion, 38 IND. L. REV. 343, 374 (2005) (“A defendant exercises control over its jurisdic-
tional exposure at the time that it decides whether to reach out to a forum state.  It is 
at this time that the defendant must consider whether the ‘benefit’ of the contact is 
worth the ‘burden’ of answering to potential claims in the jurisdiction.”). 
88 See Freer, supra note 45, at 19:50-21:00 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s reasoning as 
“putting all the eggs in the contacts basket”). 
89 See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and 
McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 234 (2011) (suggesting that Justice Kennedy 
would allow the denial of jurisdiction for a Manhattan manufacturer who shipped a 
product to Jersey City—a distance of 9.6 miles); cf. Weintraub, supra note 19, at 502 
(“[T]he reasoning of [World-Wide Volkswagen] would have led to the same result if the 
Audi had been rear-ended and the suit had been brought in Pennsylvania, just across 
the state line from a courthouse in New York in which the regional distributor was in 
litigation.”).  It is worth noting that there is no explicit basis for the inverse of World-
Wide Volkswagen’s holding—i.e., that reasonableness would mandate jurisdiction in a 
closer forum—in the Court’s jurisprudence.  However, the notion was implied by  
Justice Brennan in Burger King.  See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of 
Judicial Jurisdiction:  Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 253 n.318 (2004) 
(addressing Justice Brennan’s implication that a lack of a burden on a defendant could 
be a factor that would support jurisdiction). 
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in determining whether Alaska should exercise jurisdiction under  
the fairness standard.90 
Not only does Justice Kennedy ignore World-Wide Volkswagen’s rea-
sonableness rationale, he appears to rely on aspects of that decision 
that were later affirmatively repudiated by the Court.  Justice White, 
writing for the majority in World-Wide Volkswagen, attempted to battle 
against what he viewed as a “substantial[] relax[ation]” of Due Process 
limitations on personal jurisdiction by adhering to territorial sover-
eignty as a source of authority.91  “The sovereignty of each state,” he 
wrote, “implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister 
States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of 
the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.”92  However, this 
mandate was “short-lived.”93  Only two years after arguing that inter-
state federalism was an additional source of personal jurisdiction  
authority, Justice White retreated from his World-Wide Volkswagen posi-
tion—perhaps in response to academic criticism94—in Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.95  In a footnote to that 
opinion, he wrote that the invocation of federalism in World-Wide 
Volkswagen “must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual lib-
erty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause [which is] the only 
source of the personal jurisdiction requirement.”96  The Court later con-
firmed Insurance Corp. of Ireland’s rejection of the sovereignty rationale.97 
 
90 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985) (“[M]inimum 
requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ may defeat 
the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in 
forum activities.” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. (plurality opinion) at 292)); 
see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (denying 
jurisdiction on reasonableness grounds). 
91 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-93.  According to Justice White, if reason-
ableness factors weigh against a finding of jurisdiction, it is only because the Due Pro-
cess Clause has acted “as an instrument of interstate federalism” in divesting a 
sovereign of its power to render a valid judgment.  Id. at 294. 
92 Id. at 293. 
93 Weinstein, supra note 89, at 212. 
94 For arguably the harshest critique of Justice White’s rationale, see Martin H. Re-
dish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction:  A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1112 (1981).  See also Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Cir-
cumstances”?  It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Stand-
ard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 79 n.163 (2004) (“The difficulty of justifying the 
use of sovereignty factors had been recognized for a long time, but the Redish article 
made the objection too powerful to be ignored any longer.”). 
95 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
96 Id. at 702 n.10. 
97 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (“[W]e explained 
[in Insurance Corp. of Ireland] that the requirement that a court have personal jurisdic-
tion . . . represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a 
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Despite this rejection, and despite his acknowledgement that 
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction, of course, restricts ‘judicial power not as a 
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of liberty,’” Justice Kennedy 
maintains that sovereignty is the single determinant of a judgment’s 
lawfulness.98  He argues that, because of the “unique genius of our 
Constitution,” it is possible that an individual or entity could be subject 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of the 
courts of any particular state.99  Justice Kennedy posits that the balance 
of power between states requires that a state not unlawfully intrude 
upon the sovereignty of another state,100 but he offers no example of a 
state sovereignty that would be unlawfully intruded upon should New 
Jersey exercise jurisdiction over this matter.101 
As a final note, Justice Kennedy offers no guidance as to how Robert 
Nicastro would be able to pursue his suit in any forum.  He suggests 
that perhaps Congress would legislate on the issue to authorize juris-
diction in “appropriate courts.”102  But the meaning of that term is un-
clear, and regardless, how likely is it that Congress will take action on 
behalf of Mr. Nicastro?103  Justice Kennedy’s opinion posits that, short 
of traveling to the United Kingdom, Nicastro will be unable to recover 
for his injuries.104 
C.  Justice Breyer’s Concurrence 
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence in the judgment joined by Jus-
tice Alito, states that the Court has never found that a “single isolated 
sale,” and indeed even a sale accompanied by a sales effort of J. McIn-
tyre Machinery’s caliber, is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.105  
 
matter of personal liberty.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Parrish, supra note 17, at 14 (arguing that any doubt that personal jurisdiction has 
a basis in sovereign authority was “eradicated” by the Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland). 
98 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702). 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, among States of the United 
States, the State in which the injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of 
a products liability tort claim.”). 
102 Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion). 
103 Cf. Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 
85, 137 (1983) (“The fact that Congress has singled out certain classes of cases for ex-
tended service [of process], while leaving the balance to be governed by state long-arm 
statutes, again weakens the argument for enlarging jurisdiction by federal common law.”). 
104 See Richman, supra note 17, at 602 n.19 (“When the plaintiff’s alternative forum 
is another country, rather than another state, a jurisdictional dismissal is often fatal.”). 
105 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Citing only World-Wide Volkswagen, he wrote, “The Court has held that 
a single sale to a customer who takes an accident-causing product to a 
different State (where the accident takes place) is not a sufficient basis 
for asserting jurisdiction.”106  
But this proposition is incorrect.  Unlike World-Wide Volkswagen, the 
metal shearing machine was not sold in another state and taken, “uni-
lateral[ly],”107 to the forum where it caused injury to the plaintiff.108  
This machine was delivered—quite possibly directly from J. McIntyre 
Machinery itself109—to New Jersey, the state where it caused the inju-
ry.110  Furthermore, J. McIntyre is not the small-time upstate New York 
dealership suddenly subject to a products liability suit in Oklahoma.111  
Yet, one could infer from Justice Breyer’s opinion that he finds J. 
McIntyre Machinery and the New York dealership in World-Wide 
Volkswagen to be indistinguishable.112  First, let us not forget the Court’s 
words in World-Wide Volkswagen—a case Justice Breyer is all too eager 
to compare to J. McIntyre—that where the sale of a product arises from 
a manufacturer’s efforts to sell its product in several states, “it is not 
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly 
defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner 
or others.”113  Second, unlike the dealership in World-Wide Volkswagen, 
J. McIntyre Machinery is a well-established manufacturer of scrap  
 
106 Id. 
107 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (quoting 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
108 In World-Wide Volkswagen the plaintiff brought the car from New York to Okla-
homa.  See Ides, supra note 73, at 372 (describing Justice Breyer’s retelling of the 
Court’s holding in World-Wide Volkswagen as “descriptively accurate, but . . . somewhat 
misleading in the present context, [as t]he holding in World-Wide Volkswagen instead 
turned on how the product reached the forum state,” not the fact that it was sold there 
(emphasis added)). 
109 Scholars have questioned the path the metal shearing machine took to reach 
New Jersey.  See Alan B. Morrison, The Impacts of McIntyre on Minimum Contacts, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 3 (2011), http://groups.law.gwu.edu/LR/ArticlePDF/ 
Morrison_SME_Arguendo.pdf (suggesting that it would have been more practical for J. 
McIntyre Machinery to ship the machine directly to New Jersey rather than to McIntyre 
America in Ohio to then be shipped to New Jersey). 
110 See Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty and Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine:  Up the Stream 
of Commerce Without a Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 109-10 (1991) (discussing how, 
in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court “left the lower courts . . . to grapple with the dis-
tinction . . . apparently made between goods which are brought into a state by con-
sumers and cause injury and goods which are sent into the state by a manufacturer or 
distributor, purchased there by a ‘consumer,’ and then cause injury”). 
111 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288. 
112 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
113 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
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metal shearing machines that chose to employ an exclusive distribution 
system “with the express goal of exploiting the entire U.S. market.”114 
Later in his opinion, Justice Breyer offers his own hypothetical: 
What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which specifi-
cally seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its product in a 
distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small manufacturer (say, 
an Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and saucers) exclu-
sively to a large distributor, who resells a single item (a coffee mug) to a 
buyer from a distant state (Hawaii).115 
Professor Ides lambasts Justice Breyer for using this hypothetical to 
avoid confronting the issues present in this case.116  He argues that 
while Justice Breyer “worries” about the harm and inconvenience that 
could befall potential defendants under such a broad jurisdictional 
regime, he has “no parallel concern” for any consumers who would be 
injured by his imaginary defendants’ products sold into the U.S. mar-
ket.117  Regardless of the implications of the comparison between J. 
McIntyre Machinery and the Appalachian potter, Justice Breyer’s hy-
pothetical case could, just as Justice Kennedy’s, be disposed of easily, 
reasonably, and fairly.118  But by framing the case in this way, Justice 
Breyer, like Justice Kennedy, has essentially (and unnecessarily) ruled 
out allowing jurisdiction in a closer forum.119 
Now, if one were to take a page out of the Kennedy-Breyer play-
book and compare J. McIntyre Machinery to any of the past personal 
jurisdiction defendants (real or hypothetical), the corporation is 
much more akin to the Court’s characterization of the defendants in 
Burger King—savvy businessmen who were aware of the nature of the 
franchising business and knew how to negotiate a contract120—than 
anyone else.  There seem to be two defendant archetypes:  the “Appa-
lachian potter”–type and the “experienced and sophisticated busi-
nessman”–type.  It is well within the “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice”121 to consider subjecting one of these types of 
defendants to jurisdiction, and not the other.  Identifying whether a 
 
114 Ides, supra note 73, at 379. 
115 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
116 Ides, supra note 73, at 379. 
117 Id. at 379 n.147. 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. 
119 See Freer, supra note 45, at 20:00. 
120 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479-80, 484 (1985) (discussing 
the “sophisticated” franchisees’ “deliberate” choice to negotiate the franchise agreement). 
121 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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defendant is one type or the other in personal jurisdiction cases 
should be fairly straightforward. 
D.  Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg, who “has been quoted more than once as saying 
that she would write the opinions for all the procedure cases that 
come before the Court if only her colleagues would let her,”122 was only 
able to garner the votes of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan in her dissent.  
According to Justice Ginsburg, “the splintered majority . . . ‘turn[ed] the 
clock back to the days before modern long-arm statutes when a manu-
facturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need 
only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent dis-
tributors market it.’”123 
Justice Ginsburg, though not specifically mentioning the fair play 
and substantial justice analysis from World-Wide Volkswagen, Burger King, 
and Asahi, argued that holding J. McIntyre Machinery amenable to 
suit in New Jersey would be both fair and reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.124  She attacked the plurality’s adherence to sovereignty 
first by invoking Shaffer v. Heitner, which stated that, in then-
contemporary personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, “the mutually ex-
clusive sovereignty of the States [is not] . . . the central concern of the 
inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”125  She also maintained that the 
Court had already clarified that the Due Process Clause, which con-
tains no mention of federalism or state sovereignty concerns, is the 
only constitutional source of the personal jurisdiction requirement.126 
Justice Ginsburg argued that the modern approach to jurisdiction, 
beginning with International Shoe, “gave prime place to reason and 
fairness.”127  With that primacy in mind, she reasoned that conven-
ience and choice-of-law considerations “point in th[e] direction” of 
requiring the burden to be placed on J. McIntyre Machinery.128  “On 
 
122 Tobias Barrington Wolff, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sensible Pragmatism in Federal 
Jurisdictional Policy, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 840 (2009). 
123 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2795 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Laby-
rinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 555 (1995)). 
124 Id. at 2804. 
125 433 U.S. 186, 204 & n.20 (1977). 
126 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra note 96 and 
accompanying text. 
127 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
128 Id.; see also Freer, supra note 45, at 22:40 (relating Justice Ginsburg’s discussion 
of various reasonableness factors to Justice Black’s approach in McGee). 
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what measure of reason and fairness,” she asked, “can it be considered 
undue to require [J.] McIntyre [Machinery] to defend in New Jersey 
as an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its industrial ma-
chines anywhere and everywhere in the United States?”129  Justice 
Ginsburg subscribed to the theory, rejected by the plurality, that the 
United States be considered a single national market.130  When a party 
has purposefully availed itself of the benefits in that single market, any 
state can hale that party into its courts.   
The requirement of purposeful availment “ensures that a defend-
ant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ 
‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.”131 Justice Ginsberg was not con-
cerned with specific state markets, emphasizing instead that the com-
pany’s products were sold somewhere in the United States.  Because J. 
McIntyre itself (through its exclusive distributor) targeted the United 
States as a whole, states within the United States should be able to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre.  Further, when J. McIntyre sold the 
offending machine to a consumer in New Jersey, its affiliation with the 
forum—which is the determinative issue in specific jurisdiction cas-
es—could not be called “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated.”132  
Justice Ginsburg urged that the burden be placed on the distribu-
tor to defend in New Jersey because defending in such a forum is a 
“reasonable cost of transacting business internationally,” compared to 
the burden on Robert Nicastro to travel to England to recover for his 
injuries.133  “[I]t would undermine principles of fundamental fairness 
to insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court at 
the place within the United States where the manufacturer’s products 
caused injury.”134  And yet that is just what the plurality did. 
 
129 Id. 
130 See id. at 2801 (concluding that McIntyre “purposefully availed itself of the 
United States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a discrete collection 
of States” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay 
Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defend-
ants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 805 (1987) (noting that, after Asahi,  some lower courts 
have found a minimum contacts analysis satisfied by “allowing consideration of the de-
fendant’s contacts with the nation as a whole, rather than simply those with the forum”). 
131 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). 
132 Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). 
133 Id.; see also supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. 
134 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg 
cites several cases in support of this proposition, in which “an alien or out-of-state cor-
poration . . . through a distributor, targeted a national market, including any and all 
States” and jurisdiction over that entity was maintained).  Id. at 2804. 
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III.  THE AFTERMATH:  STICKING TO  
THE STATUS QUO? 
After waiting over two decades for clearer guidance on personal  
jurisdiction cases, lower courts have once again been tasked with the 
interpretation of a Supreme Court plurality opinion.  Without binding 
authority from above, it is not surprising that, in the wake of J. McIn-
tyre, few courts have changed their personal jurisdiction framework.  
Most courts have either explicitly stated that J. McIntyre has changed 
nothing135 or have sub silentio continued to use their pre–J. McIntyre 
tests for personal jurisdiction.136  Such a division in lower courts leads 
not only to uncertainty in the law and “undesirable” forum shop-
ping,137 but also engenders a system in which litigants’ right to access 
the courts is determined on a court-by-court basis.  The confusion 
caused by the Court’s abandonment of a reasonableness and fairness 
standard is evident in the Cargotec cases,138 a pair of post–J. McIntyre 
cases whose facts bear a striking resemblance to their predecessor. 
The Cargotec cases involve forklifts designed and manufactured by 
Moffett Engineering, Ltd., an Irish corporation with its principal place 
of business in Dundalk, Ireland.139  In both cases, the company claimed 
no direct connection with the forum state.140  The company has no em-
ployees or agents stationed in the forum states, it never ships products 
directly to those states, and it never directly solicited business from 
companies located in those states.141 
 
135 See, e.g., Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., No. 10-0114, 2011 WL 5005199, at *4 
(D. Md. Oct. 20, 2011) (considering J. McIntyre in detail and concluding that the case 
generally “affirms the status quo”). 
136 See, e.g., Adelson v. Hananel, 652 F.3d 75, 80-84 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying the 
same test the First Circuit used prior to J. McIntyre); Furminator, Inc. v. Wahba, No. 10-
1941, 2011 WL 3847390, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2011) (applying previously existing 
Circuit precedent).  In fact, now more than ever, “the courts are rediscovering that 
plurality opinions do not mean that much.”  Gary A. Magnarini, Jurisdiction Over For-
eign-Nation Manufacturers:  Tracking the Resurgent “Stream of Commerce” Theory, 68 FLA. B.J. 
38, 40 (March 1994). 
137 Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks:  Disharmony, Confusion, 
and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 
681, 682 (2009). 
138 The individual cases are Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 10-0236, 2011 WL 
4443626 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2011), and Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 09-0071, 2011 
WL 4587583 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 2011). 
139 Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *1; Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *1. 
140 Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *1; Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *1. 
141 Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *1; Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *1. 
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Moffett sells all of its products to Cargotec USA, Inc., which, in turn, 
markets and sells Moffett’s products throughout the United States.142  
Under a contract between the two companies, Cargotec has the “ex-
clusive right” to market and sell Moffett’s products.143  The contract 
defines Cargotec’s sales territory as the “United States,” and Cargotec 
markets and sells Moffett products in all fifty states.144  Moffett does 
not direct and has no knowledge of Cargotec’s sales activity; it does 
not communicate with the retail purchasers of its products.145  Accord-
ing to the evidence submitted, “Moffett remains wholly unaware of 
who the purchaser is or where they are located.”146  Despite its alleged 
ignorance of Cargotec’s activities, Moffett products have sold well in 
the United States; since the year 2000, Moffett has sold 13,073 forklifts 
to Cargotec,147 and the value of these forklifts exceeds $460 million.148 
In Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., a Mississippi resident was struck 
and killed by one of Moffett’s forklifts.149  The U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Mississippi had previously denied Moffett’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but Moffett filed a 
motion for reconsideration in the wake of J. McIntyre.150  In response to 
Moffett’s motion for reconsideration, the district judge stated that be-
cause Justice Breyer did not choose between the Asahi opinions,151 and 
because he did not reject the notion that “mere foreseeability or aware-
ness is a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if the 
defendant’s product made its way into the forum state while still in the 
 
142 Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *1. 
143 Id.; see also Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *8 (“Cargotec has the exclusive right to 
market and sell Moffett’s products in the United States.”). 




148 The opinion cited an amount of 254 million Euro.  Id. at *1.  The figure above 
was calculated using the exchange rate the judge utilized later in the opinion.  See id. at 
*7 (calculating the likely value of the sales in American currency). 
149 Id. at *1. 
150 See id. at *2. 
151 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality 
opinion) (O'Connor, J.) (stating that without “[a]dditional conduct,” “a defendant's 
awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum 
State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream of  
commerce into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.”); see also id. at 
117 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“As long as a participant in this pro-
cess is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility 
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”) 
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stream of commerce,”152 J. McIntyre “is rather limited in its applicabil-
ity.”153  Justice Breyer’s opinion did not provide the district court with 
any grounds to depart from binding Fifth Circuit precedent, which 
had “establish[ed] Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion as the controlling 
analysis.”154  Stating that, at best, J. McIntyre is applicable to cases in 
which the facts are the same, the court cited the sale of 203 forklifts to 
Mississippi customers over the previous decade as sufficient minimum 
contacts to remove the case from “the scope of McIntyre’s applicabil-
ity,” and the motion for reconsideration was denied.155 
A second suit alleging similar facts, Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., was 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.156   
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit follows Justice O’Connor’s 
Asahi plurality opinion.157  But, as in Ainsworth, because the Supreme 
Court in J. McIntyre did not conclusively define the scope of the 
stream-of-commerce theory, and because Justice Breyer chose to rely 
on current Court precedent, the Lindsey court decided that J. McIntyre 
had given it no cause to abandon Justice O’Connor’s standard.158  
However, on roughly the same facts regarding the relationship between 
 
152 Id. at *5 (citing Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 470  
(5th Cir. 2006)). 
153 Id. at *7. 
154 See id.; see also Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that 
in the Fifth Circuit, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the 
narrowest grounds.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
155 Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *7. 
156 Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 09-00071, 2011 WL 4587583 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 
30, 2011).  The Kentucky Supreme Court recently ruled that Kentucky’s long-arm stat-
ute, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)(a) (Lexis Nexis 2008), is not coterminal with the 
Due Process Clause of the Constitution and instead involves a two-step process.  See 
Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Ky. 2011) (“[T]he proper analysis of long-arm 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consists of a two-step process under which 
review first proceeds under [section] 454.210 and, if jurisdiction is permissible under 
the long-arm statute, only then is jurisdiction under federal due process examined.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  The court in Lindsey opted to skip the first step, 
because, according to the court, an exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process 
regardless of the analysis under the statute.  Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *2.  Although 
the court skipped the first of the two steps, it seems as though the corporation would 
be within the reach of the long-arm statute, given the facts of the case.  See, e.g., Hin-
ners, 336 S.W.3d at 896 (“A plain reading of the statutory language produces the 
interpretation that . . . the contract provide for the supplying of services or goods 
to be transported into, consumed or used in Kentucky.”).   
157 See Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *4 (asserting that the Sixth Circuit does not 
consider a defendant’s placement of a product into the stream of commerce sufficient 
to constitute an act of purposeful direction). 
158 Id. at *7. 
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Moffett and Cargotec,159 the court determined that “[b]ecause Mof-
fett’s distribution agreement with Cargotec to market and sell forklifts 
to the national market is not conduct that targets any specific forum 
State, . . . and in light of Moffett’s lack of control over the distribu-
tion,” Moffett showed no purposeful availment of Kentucky’s laws suf-
ficient to meet Justice O’Connor’s standard.160  Thus the motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was granted.161  These two cas-
es involved the same manufacturer, the same distributor, the same 
distribution agreement, the same defective forklift model, and the 
same Supreme Court case, but resulted in opposite holdings.  Where 
is the fair play and substantial justice in that? 
CONCLUSION 
With Asahi, the Court inaugurated a period of great uncertainty in 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, and now, over twenty-five years 
later, state and lower federal courts still find themselves in the dark.  
Faced with obvious doctrinal confusion, and an opportunity to correct 
the problem, the Court in J. McIntyre failed to clear the murky waters.  
The damage to the reasonableness and fairness standard may be ir-
reparable.  If the Court’s reasoning in J. McIntyre holds, defendants 
could, by having sufficiently few contacts with any single state, escape 
jurisdiction in all states. 
The Court in McGee spoke of the “increasing nationalization of 
commerce”162 as the grounds for expanding the “permissible scope of 
state jurisdiction.”163  Nearly six decades after that decision, the in-
creasingly global nature of commerce is undeniable.  The Court rec-
ognized more than 50 years ago that concepts such as “‘consent,’ 
‘doing business,’ and ‘presence’” were poor standards for “measuring 
the extent of state judicial power over [foreign] corporations.”164  
What was true in 1957 should be true in 2012; the New Jersey Su-
preme Court reasoned in this case that, in light of our changing glob-
al economy, we must “discard outmoded constructs of jurisdiction” in 
products liability cases like the one then before the court and choose 
 
159 See id. at *7-12 (outlining the business arrangement between Moffett  
and Cargotec).  
160 Id. at *10 (quoting Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, No. 08-5489, 2011 
WL 3702423, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
161 Id. 
162 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
163 Id. at 222. 
164 Id.  
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a standard that will provide relief to those “harmed by the products  
of a foreign manufacturer that knows or should know, through  
thedistribution scheme it employs, that its wares might find  
their way into our State.”165 
The Cargotec dichotomy shows that, whatever else the Court does,  
it must at least choose a standard.  Unless justice is different in  
Mississippi than it is in Kentucky, the present mode is unsustainable.  
Although this Note argues that the “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice”166 standard is the best standard, it is in the best in-
terests of future litigants that the Court at least agree on a standard.  
Whatever the personal jurisdiction standard may be, it must take into 
account current business practice and the foreseeable needs of plain-
tiffs who seek redress in the courts of their home states. 
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165 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 591 (N.J. 2010). 
166 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
